Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal
Volume 30 | Number 2

Article 2

1-1-2008

The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image
Licensors, and the Public Domain
Mary Campbell Wojcik

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_comm_ent_law_journal
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons,
and the Intellectual Property Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Mary Campbell Wojcik, The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman, Image Licensors, and the Public Domain, 30 Hastings Comm. & Ent.
L.J. 257 (2008).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_comm_ent_law_journal/vol30/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Communications and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

The Antithesis of Originality: Bridgeman,
Image Licensors, and the Public Domain
by
MARY CAMPBELL WOJCIK

I. Introduction ......................................................
257
II. Development of the Bridgeman Doctrine ..................................
260
A. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corporation ......................
260
B. Bridgeman in Other Courts .........................................
263
III. Responses to Bridgeman .............................................
268
A . The Bridgem an Art Library .........................................
268
B. Bridgeman in the Museum Community .................................
270
V . Potential Courses of A ction ...........................................
273
A . Copyright Imbalance .............................................
273
B . Charting a C ourse ...............................................
274
1. C ivil A ction .................................................
275
2. Life After Bridgeman: A Question of Contract ....................
276
3. Unconscionable Contracts of Adhesion ..............................
279
4. Preemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 301 .................................
284
V I. Conclusion ......................................................
285

I.

Introduction

The Bridgeman Art Library bills itself as "the world's richest, most
reliable and most prestigious source of fine art images covering every
media, period, movement and style throughout the history of art."' A
British company with offices in New York, London, Paris, and Berlin,
Bridgeman has amassed a vast library of high-quality photographic
reproductions of famous paintings and photographs. 2 For a fee, Bridgeman
1. Mark Peters, Culture Fine Art History, LetsGoDigital (June 29, 2007),
http://www.letsgodigital.org/en/15183/art-history/; see The Bridgeman Art Library,
http://www.bridgeman.co.uk/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
2. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Bridgeman obtains its reproductions of these images in the form of either large format color
transparencies or digital files-directly from the owners of the original works or by assignment
from freelance photographers that it hires specifically for this purpose. Id. at 423-24.
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will both provide you with one of these copy images and license you to
reproduce it. If, for example, you are an art historian publishing a book
about the nineteenth-century American painter Thomas Eakins, you will
undoubtedly need numerous reproductions of Eakins' paintings to
accompany your text, as well as works by other artists to serve as points of
comparison. Critically, these reproductions will constitute an integral part
of your writing. Far from merely aestheticizing the reading experience,
images form the very basis of an art historian's argument. The ability to
juxtapose reproductions-and specifically good reproductions-of Eakins'
paintings with your writing will not simply enable your academic
publication to do double duty as a coffee table book. To the contrary, the
combination of image and text will determine both the clarity and the
nuance of the positions you are able to stake. Without pictures, in other
words, the full force of art historical argument fails. One should be
thankful, then, that for approximately $240 a picture, Bridgeman is willing
to provide scholars with the images and licenses they need.3
Or should we? Eakins, after all, was born in 1844, died in 1916, and
the first catalog raisonn6 of his work was published in 1933. 4 Even in the
Byzantine morass that constitutes the American copyright system-a
system where the 1978 shift from a publication to a creation standard can
lead to photographs taken in 1855 enjoying copyrights that do not expire
until 2047 5-this should place Eakins' oeuvre squarely within the public
domain. Under the explicit terms of both the Copyright Act and the
Constitution, therefore, everyone-scholars and laypeople alike-should
be free to "reproduce, prepare derivative works from, [or] distribute"

3. When I inquired about the fees Bridgeman would charge me as an art history graduate
student to provide and license copies of several Jacques-Louis David (1748-1825) paintings, the
Picture Research/Rights department informed me that their lowest-or academic-rate was $150
or $300 per image, depending upon whether the picture was to be reproduced inside or on the
cover of the text, respectively. Presumably this rate does not include the non-refundable service
fee (minimum $40) that Bridgeman adds to every order, nor the non-refundable $50 delivery fee
that Bridgeman levies if one decides to have one's images delivered electronically. See The
Bridgeman Art Library - Terms and Conditions of Submission and Reproduction of Photographs,
cl. 2, 3, http://www.bridgeman.co.uk/register/usterms.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008) [hereinafter
Terms and Conditions]. To qualify for the company's academic discount, I would need to use the
images for either my dissertation or a scholarly journal article. For the record, Bndgeman still
has not gotten back to me about how much it charges for the Mona Lisa.
4. LLOYD GOODRICH, THOMAS EAKINS: His LIFE AND WORK 1 (William Edwin Rudge,
Inc. 1933); see generally id.
5. As is the case with Charles Dodgson, a.k.a. Lewis Carroll, who today is (in)famous for
his photographs of little girls. For a discussion of the Dodgson example, see SUSAN M.
BIELSTEIN, PERMISSIONS, A SURVIVAL GUIDE: BLUNT TALK ABOUT ART AS INTELLECTUAL

PROPERTY 12-31 (University of Chicago Press 2006). Bielstein is the Executive Acquiring
Editor for Art, Architecture, Classics, and Film at the University of Chicago Press, and her book
provides a blessedly clear discussion of the American publication/creation maze.
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copies of Eakins paintings.6 How, then, can Bridgeman legally require its
image users to agree that, "any reproduction or use of the Photographs or
Reproductions" contrary to the terms of its licensing agreements, "will be
an infringement of copyright"? 7 Moreover, how can it maintain this
position when a district court in the Southern District of New York has
twice held that Bridgeman possesses no copyright interest in its exact8
photographic reproductions of two-dimensional public domain images?
Finally, why does Bridgeman have a market for its services at all? If the
public domain truly is public, why the need for the middle man? In this
age of digital cameras, home scanners and Photoshop, why do art historians
who work on public domain material still typically spend thousands of outof-pocket dollars in image fees and copyrights in order to get a single book
published?9
This article seeks to provide answers to these questions. Beginning
with an analysis of the Southern District's holding in the two Bridgeman
opinions, this article examines the reaction that the decisions have incited
among various art image licensors, specifically the Bridgeman Art Library
itself and various major museums. Focusing on the way in which these
entities have fallen back on evasion, denial, and, importantly, contract to
shore up questionable copyrights, this article argues that the art historical
and legal communities need to act now if they want to preserve meaningful,
productive access to public domain artworks. In the absence of such action,
Bridgeman's response, or more accurately, lack of response to the Southern
District's ruling could very well represent the future of public domain
imagery.

6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, authorizing Congress to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by secunng for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries," (emphasis added); 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 501(b) (2000).
7. Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at cl. 12.
8. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421, 426-427 n.47
(S.D.N.Y. 1998); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F.Supp.2d 191, 197 (S.D.N.Y.
1999).
9. Hilary Ballon, an art history professor at Columbia, and Mariet Westermann, an art
history professor at the Institute of Fine Arts, NYU, observe, "[a] monograph with 100
illustrations might well cost its authors $5,000.00 or more in permissions costs after the images
are purchased. For books on modem and contemporary art, that number is likely to be
considerably higher." Scholars in the field are expected to shoulder this financial burden
themselves, although subvention grants are sometimes available to mitigate the expense. See
Hillary Ballon & Mariet Westermann, Art History and Its Publications in the Electronic Age,
Permissions
and
Fees
(Rice
University
Press
2006),
available
at
http://cnx.org/content/m 13940/latest/.
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II. Development of the Bridgeman Doctrine
A.

Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corporation.

In 1997, a dispute arose between Bridgeman and Corel, a Canadian
computer software company. At issue was Corel's seven-CD-ROM set
containing hundreds of digital reproductions of famous paintings by
European masters. 10 Approximately one hundred and twenty of these
reproductions were of paintings of which Bridgeman also held
photographic copies, copies that it licensed its clients to use pursuant to
very specific contractual requirements." Bridgeman eventually brought
suit against Corel, claiming that it held copyrights in these reproductions
and that Corel's digital images violated them. 12 Despite the complexity
surrounding the choice of law issue, the key element that Bridgeman
needed to prove under either British or U.S. law was originality.' 3 Inorder
to succeed on the merits, Bridgeman was required to establish that its
reproductions were sufficiently original to qualify for copyright
protection."4 Moreover, the district court found that U.K. and U.S. law
defined "originality" in a virtually synonymous fashion, with both
obligating Bridgeman to demonstrate that its photographic reproductions
"ow[ed] [their] creation to the author and [were] not merely copied."' 15
Bridgeman never contested that the paintings that it reproduced and
licensed-which included the Mona Lisa' 6 -lay squarely in the public
domain.' 7 It maintained, however, that these copies possessed sufficient
originality, in and of themselves, to qualify for copyright protection. In
other words, Bridgeman asserted its right to brand its exact reproduction of
Leonardo's masterpiece, painted sometime between 1503 and 1507, with a
late twentieth-century copyright.

10. See Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp.2d at 424.
11. Id. at 423-24.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 425 ("[t]o establish copyright infringement under the Copyright Act of 1976, the
plaintiff must establish ownership of a valid copyright and copying.").
14. See id. at 427 n.41 ("As does the U.K. Act, the Copyright Act extends protection only to
'original works of authorship."') (citing 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1998)).
15. Id. (citing Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991)). See
also, id. at 426 ("[t]o be original, a work 'need not be original or novel in form, but it must
originate with the author and not be copied from another work."') (citing The Copyright, Designs

and Patents Act, 1988, ch. 1, § 1(1) (UK)). As the Feist Court held, "The sine qua non of
copyright is originality. To qualify for copyright protection, a work must be original to the
author." Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
16. Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp.2d at 429.
17. Id. at 424.
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In support of this position, Bridgeman advanced several distinct
arguments. As a primary matter, Bridgeman asserted that the change in
medium from painting to photograph that necessarily occurred as it copied
the Old Masters rendered the resultant reproductions sufficiently original to
qualify for copyright protection.' 8 Alternatively, it asserted that the color
correction bars that it included with its reproductions were enough to lend
its copy images the requisite originality.' 9 Bridgeman further insisted that
the court should construe the fact that the British Register of Copyrights
had issued a certificate of registration for one of Bridgeman's
reproductions as conclusive proof that its images were copyrightable. 2 °
Finally, Bridgeman argued that photography itself constituted an inherently
original practice, presumably implying that any
photograph fell or would
21
fall within the legitimate domain of copyright.
The court rightly rejected all of these arguments, granting summary
judgment in favor of Corel.22 In fact, it did so twice, once pursuant to
British law and then again pursuant to American copyright doctrine. 23 In
both of its opinions, the court explicitly held that a change in medium alone
would not confer sufficient originality to entitle a work to copyright
protection. In the words of the court, "the change of medium is
immaterial. 24 As the court elaborated, "a copy in a new medium is
18. Id. at 426 ("Bridgeman nevertheless, claims that its works are original. It argues first
that the variation in medium establishes sufficient variation from the underlying works to support
originality.").
19. Id. at 427 ("Plaintiff next argues that its images are original because of the attached
color correction bars."). Such bars appear as a multicolored strip attached to an image. Because
the colors in the strip are standardized, they allow one to determine whether any distortion has
occurred in an image's own color and to adjust accordingly. As such, color correction bars
constitute an added technology rather than any sort of meaningful alteration of an image itself.
20. Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F.Supp.2d 191, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
21. See Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp. 2d at 427 ("Finally, plaintiff argues that photography
requires artistic talent and originality and therefore would have the Court conclude that its
transparencies-photographs of underlying works of art-are original.").
Additionally, on
reconsideration, Plaintiff argued that the district court had misconstrued British copyright law by
failing to follow the Graves' Case, (1869) LR 4 QB 715, which stated "All photographs are
copies of some object, such as a painting or statute. And it seems to me that a photograph taken
from a picture is an onginal photograph, in so far that to copy it is an infringement of the statute."
Id. at 722. Judge Kaplan dismissed this argument, noting that Bridgeman had failed to consider
"the antiquity of the Graves' Case and the subsequent development of the law of originality in the
United Kingdom." 36 F.Supp.2d at 199.
22. Id. at 430; Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 200.
23. Judge Kaplan initially ruled that British law governed the issue at hand, stating,
however, that the court would have reached the same conclusions under U.S. law. Bridgeman, 25
F.Supp.2d at 426-427, n.47. Pursuant to Bridgeman's motion for reconsideration, the court found
that U.S. law properly governed, using its second opinion "to give a somewhat fuller statement of
the Court's reasoning." Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 195.
24. Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 199. See also, Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp. at 427 ("The mere
reproduction of a work of art in a different medium should not constitute the required originality
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copyrightable only where, as often but not always is the case, a copier
makes some identifiable original contribution., 25 In striving to provide its
clients with absolutely accurate reproductions of public domain paintings,
Bridgeman not only failed to make such a contribution but actively took
great pains to avoid it. At trial, Lady Bridgeman, the plaintiffs principal,
had testified "that the goal of the transparencies is to be as true to the
original work as possible," and in its memo in opposition to summary
judgment, Bridgeman had argued "that in creating the transparencies ....
Bridgeman strives to make the transparency look as identical to the
underlying work of art as possible .... ,,26 In refusing to attribute
originality to these laborious efforts at absolute accuracy, the court simply
declined to allow Bridgeman to play both sides of the coin.
Although the court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of the
originality of Bridgeman's inclusion of color correction bars in its
reproductions, 27 it suggested that it would have rejected this argument on
similar grounds.

As Judge Kaplan found, "[t]he color bars . . . are

employed to make sure that the transparency is a genuine reflection of the
colors of the original work of art.",28 As for Bridgeman's argument
concerning its British certification of copyright registration, the court
deemed this position "misguided," holding that the presumption of
copyright validity that such registration conferred had here been rebutted. 9
Finally, the court declined to adopt Bridgeman's sweeping declaration that
all photographs are innately original and therefore inherently copyrightable.
"To be sure," the court observed, "much, perhaps almost all, photography
is sufficiently original to be subject to copyright .... But one need not

deny the creativity inherent in the art of photography to recognize that a
photograph which is no more than a copy of the work of another as exact
as science and technology permit lacks originality.That is not to say such a

for the reason that no one can claim to have independently evolved any particular medium. -As
discussed above, the law requires "some element of material alteration or embellishment" to the
totality of the work. At bottom, the totality of the work is the image itself, and Bridgeman
admittedly seeks to duplicate exactly the images of the underlying works.") (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
25. Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 199.
26. Id. Indeed, this only makes sense. One can only imagine the quick drop off in client
satisfaction that Bridgeman would experience if its copy photographers took to introducing their
own, original elements into their reproductions of various El Grecos and Vermeers.
27. "The Court, however, need not decide whether Bridgeman's images are copyrightable to
the extent of this feature. As indicated below, even if the images with color bars attached are
copyrightable, they may be infringed only by reproduction of Bridgeman's unique variation, the
color bars.
As Corel's images do not include correction strips, their significance for
copyrightability is academic in this case." Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp.2d at 428.
28. Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 199 (internal quotation omitted).
29. Id. at 200.
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feat is trivial, simply not original. The more persuasive analogy is that of a
' 30
photocopier."
B. Bridgeman in Other Courts.
Confronted with this unambiguous double ruling that it held
absolutely no copyright interest in the public domain images it licensed,
Bridgeman chose not to appeal. Instead, the company allowed Judge
Kaplan's two opinions to stand uncontested at the district court level, the
reasoning of a single trial judge that other courts can either adopt or reject
as they see fit. As this article discusses below, this has proved to be
exceptionally sound strategy, both for Bridgeman and for other image
licensors. Despite the solidity of Judge Kaplan's logic, neither of the
Bridgeman opinions has been cited extensively outside of New York, nor
have they been affirmed at the appellate level. Although no current case
calls either Bridgeman into question on the issue of originality and
copyrightability, the two rulings have only been cited three times in
published opinions on the relevant issue, in each instance by the Southern
District of New York.31 In Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., the court relied
on both Bridgeman opinions for the principle that no copyright inheres in
images that seek to accurately reproduce paintings that have passed into the
public domain. 32 In Eastern America Trio Products, Inv. v. Tang
Electronic Corp., the court used the 1999 Bridgeman ruling to support the
uncontroversial doctrine that the law grants "a very broad scope for
copyright in photographs, encompassing almost any photograph that
reflects more than 'slavish copying."' 33 And in Diamond Direct, LLC v.
Star Diamond Group, Inc., the Southern District again cited the 1999
Bridgeman opinion as precedent for both the originality requirement
imposed by copyright law and the rebuttability of the prima facie
presumption of validity conferred by copyright registration.34
Unfortunately, the other extant case that endorses Bridgeman's treatment of
originality, copyrightability, and the public domain was issued as
unpublished opinion and therefore provides an uncertain measure of
precedent for future legal proceedings.35
30. Bridgeman, 25 F.Supp.2d at 427 (emphasis added).
3 1. Perhaps it is a bit ungenerous to observe here that it is always, in fact, Judge Kaplan
who cites Bridgeman.
32. Mannion v. Coors Brewing Co., 377 F.Supp.2d 444, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
33. E. Am. Trio Prods., Inc. v. Tang Elec. Corp., 97 F.Supp.2d 395, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
34. Diamond Direct LLC v. Star Diamond Group, Inc., 116 F.Supp.2d 525, 527 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
35. In Schiffer Publ'g., Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 2004 WL 2583817 (E.D.Pa. Nov. 12,
2004), a district court in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was confronted with the question of
originality in the context of photographs of textiles. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants,
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Despite the paucity of explicit affirmation, several cases throughout
the country do implicitly adopt Bridgeman's logic. The most authoritative
of these is the Sixth Circuit's decision in ATC Distribution Group v.
Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts.36 In this case, ATC, a seller of
automobile transmission parts sued its competitor Whatever It Takes
Transmission & Parts and an employee for copyright infringement and
various state law torts. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendants on almost all of ATC's claims, and ATC appealed. 37 The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in its entirety. 38 Most
importantly, the appellate court ruled that ATC lacked a valid copyright in

Chronicle Books, infringed plaintiffs' copyrights in photographs of fabric swatches when they
copied these images in their book, 1000 Patterns, without permission or compensation. Id. at * 1.
In its defense, Chronicle Books invoked Bridgeman I, arguing that, like Bridgeman, plaintiffs
sought "simply to create accurate facsimiles of the fabric designs," a form of slavish copying not
entitled to copyright protection under the law. Id. at *8. The court disagreed. Critically, however,
in so doing it did not question the logic of Bridgeman but rather distinguished the facts of
Schiffer's case. As the court held:
Bridgeman's stated purpose was to reproduce precisely the underlying works of art. Indeed,
the goal of reproducing a famous work of art is an accurate replication that is faithful to the
original artwork. There is no ulterior creative purpose--indeed, creativity is anathema to that
goal. Plaintiffs, by contrast, did not attempt to replicate fabric swatches as precisely as
possible. Rather, Plaintiffs' books were focused mainly on patterns, and Plaintiffs'
photographers strove to create images that were visually interesting. In fact, several
photographers clearly stated that they never compared the fabric swatches to their
photographs, precisely because such a comparison was unimportant to their goals.
Id. (internal citations omitted). (The court also distinguished the two cases on the basis of the first
Bridgeman's reliance on English law, see id., a distinction that lacks force in light of both Judge
Kaplan's statements that his judgment would have been the same under American law and his
eventual decision to that effect in the second Bridgeman opinion). As such Schiffer affirms the
first Bridgeman decision, albeit implicitly. The court's careful articulation of the factual reasons
why Plaintiffs' images fell outside Bridgeman's exception to copyrightability stands as a tacit
acceptance of precisely this exception. This is particularly true in light of the court's subsequent
holding in the Schiffer matter. See Schiffer Publ'g, Ltd. v. Chronicle Books, LLC, 2005 WL
1244923 (E.D.Pa. May 24, 2005). Pursuant to its finding that Chronicle Books did, in fact,
infringe Schiffer's copyrights in its fabric photos, the court awarded Schiffer $150,000 in
statutory damages and permanently enjoined Chronicle Books from selling their book 1000
Patternswithin the United States. Id. at * 1. Schiffer subsequently moved for costs and attorneys'
fees, arguing, inter alia, that "Defendants advanced an objectively unreasonable legal argument
by asserting that the so-called 'flat photography' employed by Plaintiffs was not copyrightable."
Id. at *5. The court rejected this argument, explaining that "photographs are not per se
copyrightable" and that "the Bridgeman decision gave Defendants some legal basis for their
position ....
Although the attempt failed, it served to clarify the extent of the Copyright Act's
protections, which furthered the development of Copyright law." Id. In other words, Bridgeman
might not have applied to the facts of the Schiffer case, but it stood as good law.
36. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700 (6th Cir. 2005).
37. Id. at 702-03.
38. Id.
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the illustrations of transmission parts that it included in its catalog. As the
court held:
The illustrations in the catalog are hand-drawn sketches of transmission
parts, copied from photographs cut out of competitors' catalogs .... The
illustrations in ATC's catalog fall far short of the 'substantial variation'
required to justify copyright protection. The illustrationswere intended
to be as accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the
photographson which they39were based, a form of slavish copying that is
the antithesis of originality.

Although the A TC court did not cite either Bridgeman opinion, its holding
is completely consonant with Judge Kaplan's reasoning. As in both
Bridgeman decisions, the court denied copyright protection to
reproductions that sought to faithfully and transparently convey an
underlying, uncopyrighted picture; as in Bridgeman, the court found that no
originality inhered in such slavish reproductions. Critically, A TC is a Sixth
Circuit decision. It therefore provides strong appellate precedent for the
position that one holds no copyright interest in substantially exact copies of
public domain images.
Additionally, as of this writing, two district court cases have cited
ATC on the issue of copyrightability. In Decker Inc. v. G & N Equipment

Co., a district court for the Eastern District of Michigan refused to grant the
defendant's motion for summary judgment on the issue of copyright
infringement. The court ruled that, unlike the illustrations at issue in A TC,
the photographs in the instant matter potentially involved a measure of
39. Id. at 713 (citing J.Thomas Distribs., Inc. v. Greenline Distribs., Inc., No. 95-2100, slip
op., 1996 WL 636138 at *2 (C.A.6 (Mich.) Oct. 31, 1996). Like ATC, J. Thomas is a Sixth
Circuit opinion that supports Judge Kaplan's reasoning in Bridgeman. Unfortunately, like
Schiffer, J. Thomas is an unpublished slip opinion. In J. Thomas, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
district court's grant of summary judgment of no copyright infringement. A distributor of
replacement parts for power landscaping equipment, J. Thomas sued another such distributor,
Greenline, for copyright infringement. According to J. Thomas, Greenline's mail-order catalog
infringed J. Thomas's copyrights in its own catalog, specifically J. Thomas's rights in the section
listing lawn mower replacement belts and a particular drawing of a spindle. See, J. Thomas, No.
95-2100, slip op. at *1. In affirming summary judgment in Greenline's favor, the Sixth Circuit
held:
The drawing of the spindle bearing ... fails to meet the minimum level of originality and
creativity required for copyright protection. Although reproductions are generally entitled to
copyright protection, the initial reproduction still requires a minimum level of originality
and creativity which plaintiff did not meet. Plaintiff's spindle bearing was drawn with the
express intention of duplicating on paper the appearance of an actual spindle bearing. Its
reproduction involved absolutely no creative spark whatsoever. Furthermore, cut-away
drawings like plaintiff's drawing of the spindle bearing are common in mail-order catalogs
in the industry. Plaintiffs inclusion of the drawing in its catalog is entirely unoriginal. In
essence, the drawing is neither original nor creative. Therefore, copyright law provides it no
protection.
Id. at *2 (internal citation omitted).
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originality sufficient to invoke copyright protection.
facts from those in ATC, however, the court appears to have affirmed the
latter's holding that slavish reproductions are not copyrightable.
Similarly, in Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., a
district court for the District of Utah held that copyright law did not protect
three-dimensional digital models of Toyota cars when those models were
intended to resemble the commercial product as closely as possible. 4'
Relying on ATC, the court held that because plaintiff's images were
intended to be "production-accurate representation[s]" that did not involve
"the introduction of new creative elements" 42 they lacked the originality
requisite for copyright protection. This amounts to an implicit affirmation
of Judge Kaplan's reasoning in Bridgeman. After all, what are straight
photographs of public domain art works if not "accurate representation[s]"
of underlying images that intentionally avoid "the introduction of new
creative elements"?
It is important here to observe that as Bridgeman's logic is developed
in the jurisprudence of heavy machinery, a reproduction's originality-and
therefore its copyrightability--ceases to depend upon whether the
underlying work exists in two or three dimensions. In denying copyright
protection to Bridgeman, Judge Kaplan held, "Plaintiffs problem here is
that it seeks protection for the exception that proves the rule [that the
majority of photographs are copyrightable]: photographs of existing twodimensional articles (in this case works of art), each of which reproduces
the article in the photographic medium as precisely as technology
permits. 43 Elsewhere in his 1999 opinion, Judge Kaplan stated, "[t]here is
little doubt that many photographs, probably the overwhelming majority,
reflect at least the modest amount of originality required for copyright
protection. 'Elements of originality . . . may include posing the subjects,
lighting, angle, selection of film and camera, evoking the desired
expression, and almost any other variant involved. "44 Such statements
have led commentators to read Bridgeman as inapplicable to public domain
sculpture.
40. See Decker, Inc. v. C&G Equip. Co., 438 F.Supp.2d 734, 740-41 (E.D.Mich. 2006).
41. Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 2006 WL 2623935, at *3 (D.Utah
Sept. 12, 2006). Like Schiffer and J.Thomas, Meshwerks is an unpublished opinion.
42. Id. at *4.
43. Bridgeman, 36 F.Supp.2d at 199 (emphasis added). See also, id. at 196 n.31 ("[a]s the
Nimmers have written, there 'appear to be at least two situations in which a photograph should be
denied copyright for lack of originality,' one of which is directly relevant here: 'where a
photograph of a photograph or other printed matter is made that amounts to nothing more than
slavish copying."') (emphasis added).
44. Id at 196 (citing Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 307 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S.
934 (1992)).
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In relying so heavily on the underlying work's flatness, Judge Kaplan
unfortunately implied that reproductions of three-dimensional artworkswhich necessarily require choices of lighting and angle to cope with the
object's volume in space-possess sufficient originality to qualify for
copyright protection. In this respect, the machinery cases do not simply
affirm Bridgeman's logic but rather extend it. By basing their originality
analysis on the alleged copyright holder's intent to accurately convey an
underlying work through reproduction rather than on questions of
dimension,45 these cases actually provide stronger precedent for the
uncopyrightability of reproductions of public domain sculpture than
Bridgeman itself.
In summary, the law is becoming increasingly clear: one possesses no
copyright interest in reproductions of public domain works when these
reproductions do nothing more than accurately convey the underlying
image. This is not to say that such accurate conveyance requires no skill or
effort; it simply means that such skill and effort does not suffice to invoke
the highly advantageous legal monopoly granted under the Copyright Act.
In the words of the Supreme Court, "copyright rewards originality, not
effort. As this Court noted more than a century ago, 'great praise may be
due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in publishing this
' 46
paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being rewarded in this way.
Clearly, the law does not contemplate Bridgeman and similarly situated
image licensors being rewarded in this way, either.47 Unfortunately,
however, neither could the law have contemplated the audacity and
disregard with which Bridgeman has met the Southern District's ruling its
case. And, as this article argues below, in the absence of such legal
contemplation, entities like Bridgeman and certain major museums find
themselves free to both demand exorbitant "copyright" fees from image
users and, in the process, constrict the public domain.

45. "Plaintiffs spindle bearing was drawn with the express intention of duplicating on
paper the appearance of an actual spindle bearing," J.Thomas Distribs., Inc. v. Greenline
Distribs., Inc., No. 95-2100, slip op., 1996 WL 636138 at *2 (C.A.6 (Mich.) Oct. 31, 1996);
"Meshwerks's intent was to replicate, as exactly as possible, the image of certain Toyota
vehicles," Meshwerks, 2006 WL 2623935 at *4; "[tjhe illustrations were intended to be as
accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the photographs on which they were
based, a form of slavish copying that is the antithesis of originality," ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v.
Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700, 713 (6th Cir. 2005)(emphasis
added).
46. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 364 (1991) (quoting Baker v.
Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1879)) (internal quotation omitted).
47. Such entities include Art Resource, Scala, Corbis, and Getty Images.
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III. Responses to Bridgeman
A.

The Bridgeman Art Library.

In parsing the conditions that Bridgeman incorporates into all of its
American image licenses, 48 one gets no sense that any question exists as to
Bridgeman's intellectual property rights in its copy images, much less that
a federal district court has twice held that Bridgeman holds no such legal
interest in its reproductions of public domain works.49 Or maybe one does
get some small hint that something is amiss. Because, upon closer
examination, the interest that Bridgeman asserts in its reproductions is
deeply ambiguous. In Clause 19, for example, Bridgeman emphatically
disavows any warranty that it holds copyrights in these reproductions. As it
declares:
[Bridgeman] does not make or give either expressly or impliedly any
warranties that any rights to reproduce the paintings depicted in the
photographs have been granted nor does it warrant that no third parties
own rights in the paintings therein depicted. The copyright holder
concerned must be approachedand their permission must be sought by
the client .... 5 0 The supplier charges a fee only for providing access to the
photographs.

Bridgeman here claims to charge its customers solely for the privilege of
physical access, for the right, presumably, to receive and use the
company's high-quality, publication-suitable reproductions. Such a claim
appears to be both consistent with the Southern District's holding in
Bridgeman and the legitimate subject of contract.
What, though, should one make of Clause 21 of Bridgeman's Terms
and Conditions? Here Bridgeman states that any breach of its licensing

48. Bridgeman lists these at the bottom of its website, www.bridegeman.co.uk, under the
heading "terms and conditions americas." The company clearly intends these conditions to
function as binding contractual provisions, to the extent that it provides that when one consents to
the reproduction of any of Bridgeman's copy images "such consent shall be subject to the terms
and conditions set out in the invoice and any specific agreement in respect thereof and the
provisions set out in these terms and conditions." Terms and Conditions, clause 12 (emphasis
added). Interestingly, all first-time Bridgeman customers are assumed to automatically assent to
all of Bridgeman's terms and conditions if they fail to return its copy images within a five- to
seven-day window. See Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at p. 1. Moreover, any returning
customer is presumed to have automatically consented by force of his or her repeat business. See
id.
49. Bridgeman could, technically, possess valid rights in certain of its images. The owner of
the copyright in the underlying work, for example, could assign that copyright to Bridgeman.
Moreover, it could exclusively license Bridgeman to make copies of its work. No such right could
outlast the original copyright, however, leaving all reproductions of public domain images free
and clear.
50. Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at cl. 19 (all caps in original, emphasis added).
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agreements "will be an infringement of copyright .... "51 Whose copyright?
On what ground? Is Bridgeman honestly claiming that, in the absence of
any valid U.S. copyright in its reproductions, it can create its own copyright
regime via contracts distributed in the United States? Such claims clearly
lack legal basis. As this article discusses in more detail below, the
Copyright Act stands as the exclusive source of protection "for all legal and
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright .... ,52 As section 301(a) of Title 17 explicitly
provides, "no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right . . .
under the common law or statutes of any State., 53 There is no way, in other
words, that Bridgeman can legitimately use the common law of contract to
effectively bypass the Southern District's ruling.
Unfortunately, the key term here appears to be "legitimately." Because
one could argue that such a contractual bypass is precisely what Bridgeman
constructs with its Terms and Conditions.
Laying out specific parameters of its image licenses,5 4 Bridgeman
emphatically states, "THE COPYING OR REPRODUCTION BY
WHATEVER MEANS OF THE PHOTOGRAPHS IS STRICTLY
FORBIDDEN WITHOUT THE SPECIFIC WRITTEN CONSENT OF
[BRIDGEMAN]." 55 Critically, Bridgeman defines "reproduction" in a way
that essentially recreates the fundamental rights granted by the Copyright
Act. Under 17 U.S.C. § 106, "the owner of [a] copyright . . . has the
exclusive rights" to, among other things: (1) "reproduce the copyrighted
work"; (2) "prepare derivative rights based upon the copyrighted work";
(3) "distribute copies . . of the copyrighted work to the public"; and (4)
Section 106 further
"display the copyrighted work publicly . .. .
provides that the owner of the copyright may also authorize, i.e., license,
others to do the same. Under Bridegman's Terms and Conditions,
forbidden "REPRODUCTION includes any form of publication or copying
51. Id. at cl. 21.
52. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
53. Id.
54. Throughout its Terms and Conditions, Bridgeman insists on referring to its copy images
as "Photographs." See, Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at p. 1, "Definitions":
"PHOTOGRAPH means Transparencies, computer generated facsimiles, digital (i.e. binary)
format images, negatives, prints, designs, plates or other representations, records of copies of a
Painting, or any other item which may be offered for the purposes of Reproduction, but for the
avoidance of doubt does not include the actual work of art depicted in any of the above or in any
Painting .... " By subtly placing itself in the ring with Weston, Cartier-Bresson and the likeand, just as importantly, by leaving the utilitarian term "reproduction" to the licenseesBridgeman perhaps seeks to endow its copies with the sheen of art and therefore the protections
of copyright.
55. Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at cl. 11.
56. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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of the whole or part of any Painting [i.e., underlying work of art] whether
altered or not, and derived from any [of Bridgeman's reproductions]
whether by printing, photography, slide projection, whether or not to any
audience [,] xerography, artist's reference, artist's illustration, layout or
presentation, electronic or mechanical reproduction or storage by any other
means . . . .57' Bridgeman obligates its customers, in short, to agree that the
company enjoys the exclusive right to reproduce, distribute, display, or
prepare derivative works from its copy photographs, as well as the
exclusive right to license others to do the same.58 In other words, it forces
its clients to agree that it possess precisely those rights that that the
Southern District ruled Bridgeman does not possess under the Copyright
Act. (Perhaps this is why Bridgeman also requires its clients to agree that
"[t]hese Terms and Conditions shall be governed by the laws of England,"
that they "submit to the jurisdiction of the English courts," and that any
dispute arising out of their agreement with Bridgeman "shall be settled by
arbitration in New York City"?)59 Given that "no person is entitled to any
such right or equivalent right. . . under the common law or statutes of any
State,
it appears that Bridgeman has chosen to simply ignore the
Southern District's ruling.
B.

Bridgeman in the Museum Community.

As Susan Bielstein has noted, "Judge Kaplan's decision sent shock
waves through museum communities on both sides of the Atlantic. 6 1
Unfortunately, these shocks waves were not necessarily accompanied by
acquiescence to the Southern District's holding. Although certain museums
responded to Bridgeman with a change in their rights and reproductions

57. Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at p.1, "Definitions" (capitalization in original).
Express examples of prohibited copying include "printing, photography, slide projection, whether
or not to any audience [,] xerography, artist's reference, artist's illustration, layout or
presentation, electronic or mechanical reproduction or storage by any other means .... Id.
58. It is interesting to observe here how the clause "and derived from any [of Bridgeman's
reproduction]" essentially recreates the second prong of a copyright infringement claim,
specifically that the alleged infringer copied original elements from copyrighted work at issue.
See ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700,
705 (6th Cir. 2005): "A claim of copyright infringement requires proof of '(1) ownership of a
valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original."' (citing
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). The first prong, of course, is
conspicuously absent.
59. See Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at cl. 29. For good measure, Bridgeman also
provides that "[tlhe Client agrees to pay the Supplier any and all costs [,] expenses and reasonable
attorneys fees paid or incurred by the Supplier in enforcing or endeavoring to enforce this
agreement." Id. at cl. 30.
60. Id.
61. BIELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 43.
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policies, others took a different route, namely denial and evasion. 62 Like
Bridgeman, many museums have decided to simply ignore the law, relying
on contract and social pressure to maintain their tenuous hold on
intellectual property rights to which they enjoy questionable legal claim.
The Art Institute of Chicago provides a clear example of a museum
asserting intellectual property rights that flatly contravene Bridgeman. In
2004, the Art Institute licensed a copy of one of its paintings to an author
publishing a scholarly text. Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Art
Institute's licensing agreement, the museum required the author to
accompany the image with the credit line "Photography © The Art Institute
of Chicago."6 3 To be clear, the painting itself lay squarely within the public
domain. The "photography" in which the Art Institute claimed copyright,
then, was its exact photographic reproduction of a public domain image. In
other words, five years after Bridgeman, the Art Institute persisted in
requiring its licensee to assent to an agreement that directly contradicted
the Copyright Act as construed by a federal district judge.64 Moreover, to
the extent that the Institute's terms and conditions appear to have been a
form contract, the museum likely compelled other image users to agree to
this provision as well.
The Art Institute is certainly not alone in such practices. As Bielstein
discusses in her book, the Met has required similarly questionable credit
lines. 65 In exchange for a one-time reproduction right to Petrus Christus's

public domain painting, A Goldsmith in His Smith, Possibly Saint Eligius
(1449), for example, the Met required Bielstein "to prominently place on
all copies of the reproductions that are distributed to the public a notice of
the Museum's copyright ownership, which notice with respect to each
separate reproduction shall read as follows: 'All rights reserved, The
Metropolitan Museum of Art.",6 6 In this instance, which presumably took
place six or so years after Bridgeman, the Met did not even publicly reveal
which rights it was claiming, much less that the rights ostensibly reserved
very likely exceeded those granted by law.6 7 Instead the museum chose to
bury its tenuous copyright claim in the fine print of a private contract.

62. See id. at 45 n.19 ("A number of museums chose to ignore Bridgemanaltogether .....
63. See
generally
The
Art
Institute
of
Chicago:
Image
Licensing,
http://www.artic.edu/aic/image-licensing/index.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2008).
64. See Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1998);
Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36 F.Supp.2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
65. BIELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 48-49.
66. Id. The Met has since outsourced all of its rights and reproductions work to the image
archive Art Resource.
67. Id. at 48. In Bielstein's words, "[olne would presume that 'all rights reserved' means all
legal rights in the photograph, right?"
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These two examples represent only a few among many. 68 But perhaps
they present us with nothing untoward at all. The Art Institute could
perhaps join the ranks of those who argue that Bridgeman only applies in
New York and that Judge Kaplan's holdings therefore do not affect the
licensing arrangements of museums located elsewhere. 69 (The Met would
obviously get little traction out of this argument). The Art Institute, though,
could insist that Bridgeman has no binding force in Illinois and that the
museum therefore did nothing questionable in relying on contractual
provisions that failed to heed the Southern District. Could it really, though?
Certainly Bridgeman remains unaffirmed at the appellate level. And,
regrettably, it has not been cited in a published opinion outside of New
York.
Any museum seeking to disregard Bridgeman, however, would be
well served to remember that the truly relevant question is not whether the
decision itself has been affirmed or cited, but rather whether the logic
Judge Kaplan employed has been rejected or adopted by other courts. The
real issue is where the law stands on the originality-and therefore the
copyrightability-of accurate copies of public domain images and objects.
As this article discussed earlier, courts throughout the country are
developing a robust and seemingly unanimous jurisprudence that such
copies lack the originality to qualify for copyright protection. As the Sixth
Circuit held in ATC, "[t]he illustrations were intended to be as accurate as
possible in reproducing the parts shown in the photographs on which they
were based, a form of slavish copying that is the antithesis of originality. 7 °
The fact that the parts at issue may have been an auto part or a lawn mower
spindle rather than, say, The Venus of Urbino, is irrelevant. Any museum
that argues the inapplicability of Judge Kaplan's rulings should trade its
myopic focus on Bridgeman for a clear view of the larger copyright
landscape. Because in this landscape one holds no copyright in faithful
copies of works that have passed into the public domain, in it, Bridgeman is
only a single instance among many.

68. See id. at 45 rL19. "A number of museums chose to ignoreBridgeman altogether.."
69. Seeid. at45-46, nl9.
70. ATC Distrib. Group, Inc. v. Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d
700, 713 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing J.Thomas Distribs., Inc. v. Greenline Distribs., Inc., No. 95-2 100,
slip op., 1996 VL 636138 at *2 (C.A.6 (Mich.) Oct. 31, 1996)("Plaintiff's spindle bearing was
drawn with the express intention of duplicating on paper the appearance of an actual spindle
bearing. Its reproduction involved absolutely no creative spark whatsoever.")
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IV. Potential Courses of Action
A.

Copyright Imbalance.

At this point, one might be wondering how image licensors like
Bridgeman and various museums can get away with the sort of copyright
misuse discussed above. How can these institutions successfully assert
rights that the law seems to indicate they simply do not have? Why are they
not being forced to comply with the law? How can Bridgeman persist in
ignoring, of all things, Bridgeman? Unfortunately, the answer is all too
easy: because they can. As a primary matter, museums possess a form of
social power in relation to universities, scholarly presses, and other
potential image licensees that allows them to circumvent all but the
brightest legal lines. Bielstein provides a stark example of this in her
book. 7 1 As she explains, she at one point acquired the translation rights to a
French book that included a minor eighteenth-century print.72 The print
certainly lay in the public domain and, moreover, it existed in numerous
versions all over the world.7 3 As such, both Bielstein and the University of
Chicago Press naturally assumed the Press's right to publish it without
seeking any permissions.74 In doing so, they were most likely correct about
their legal rights. They erred, however, in calculating their social position.
Because soon thereafter, a major museum that owned a version of the print
at issue came upon the copy that Bielstein and the Press had published.
Outraged at what it claimed to be a copyright violation, the museum sent
Bielstein a letter demanding compensatory payment. More importantly, it
informed her in no uncertain terms that if she refused to pay, the museum
would cease to do business not simply with her and not just with the Press,
but with the entire University of Chicago: "the faculty wouldn't be able to
order slides from the museum or do research in the archives. In fact, any
doings the museum was having with the university system would be
suspended immediately if we didn't cough up-what was it?-a hundred
dollars. 75 Needless to say, Bielstein paid. And so, in the process, did we.
Another part of the public domain was chipped off and sold (extremely
cheaply) down the river. Terribly, this scenario plays out again and again as
academics and publishers protect their access to the images they need.
If you happen to be wondering why Bielstein and the Press did not sue
the museum for copyright misuse, the answer is that they couldn't have.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See BIELSTEIN, supra note 5.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
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Even if the economics of the situation had not so obviously disfavored
suit, 76 they lacked a cause of action and standing to sue. As other scholars

have noted, a fundamental imbalance characterizes the copyright protection
scheme. Most importantly, individual citizens harmed by copyright abuses
possess no standing to seek any form of remedy under the Copyright Act as
it now stands.77 Despite the exacting legal consequences imposed on those
who violate valid copyrights,78 no equivalent punishments exist for the
copyright misuser, even if such misuse is blatant, willful, and repeated. The
effective absence of any legal deterrent to copyright misuse that results
encourages image licensors to claim spurious copyrights in, essentially,
everything. 79 The massive profits to be reaped from such copyright
overassertion only fuel this race to slap the familiar "©" on any available
surface. These two factors go a long way towards explaining Bridgeman
and certain museums' response to Judge Kaplan's twin decisions.
B.

Charting a Course.

So what is to be done? Faced with image licensors who ignore the law
because they can, who demand high fees for "copyrights" they lack and
make up for this lack through carefully drafted contracts, who exert an
often-crippling social pressure to effectively prevent the constitutionally
mandated flow of artworks into the public domain-faced with all of this,
what can one do? Should one simply acquiesce? Should art historians
76. By my calculation, Bielstein's $100 would have gotten her roughly forty-five minutes of
work by a first-year associate at a big Chicago law firm. Not exactly enough to get the job done.
77. "Copyright law suffers from a basic defect: The law's strong protections for copyrights
are not balanced by explicit protections for the public domain. Accordingly, copyright law itself
creates strong incentives for copyfraud." Jason Mazzone, COPYFRAUD, 81 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1026,
1029 (2006). Mazzone here uses the term "copyfraud" to refer to any sort of false copyright claim
in a work that has already passed into the public domain. Id. at 1028.
While two provisions of 17 U.S.C. § 506 do provide for the criminal prosecution of
copyright misuse, they are rarely, if ever, enforced. Section 506(c) makes it a criminal violation
to place a fraudulent copyright notice on any article or to publicly distribute or import for public
distribution any article marked with such a notice. 17 U.S.C. § 506(c) (2000). Additionally,
section 506(e) criminalizes "the making of false representations of material fact in the application
for copyright registration ...... Id. § 506(e). Moreover, both of these provisions require a
showing of intent that arguably guts the majority of otherwise successful actions brought under
section 506. See id. § 506(c), requiring a showing of "fraudulent intent"; id. § 506(e),
necessitating proof that the alleged copyright abuser "knowingly ma[de] a false representation of a
material fact in the application for copyright registration .... (emphasis added).
78. Pursuant to a finding that a defendant is a copyright infringer as defined in 17 U.S.C. §
501(a), a court may: (1) "order the destruction or other reasonable disposition" of all of
defendant's infringing material; or (2) order the defendant to pay the copyright owner either: (a)
the owner's actual damages plus any additional profits that the defendant earned through
infringement, 17 U.S.C. §§ 504(a), 504(b), or (b) statutory damages up to $150,000 per work,
depending upon the defendant's intent. 17 U.S.C. §§ 503 (b), 504(a)-(c) (2000).
79. Mazzone, supra note 77, at 1029.
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simply pay the $300 for a copy of the Mona Lisa and not make trouble?
Get the books out there as best they can? Use fewer images, maybe, drop
the points of comparison and the subtle apexes of arguments that simply
refuse to gel without the pictures themselves next to the words ... lose the
epiphanic moment where idea straddles the very line between image and
text? Clearly not.
1.

Civil Action.

As a primary matter, the College Art Association ("CAA") should
initiate a program of sustained lobbying to have Congress amend the
Copyright Act to allow for civil actions against museums and other image
licensors who assert fraudulent copyrights in public domain images. As the
primary professional organization for art historians, CAA already engages
in lobbying on various intellectual property issues, including developments
in the fair use doctrine and the question of orphan works.8 0 CAA should
extend its lobbying efforts to secure a private cause of action against
copyright misusers. In his excellent article on copyright misuse, Jason
Mazzone argues that standing to sue should inhere in various classes of
plaintiffs, including those who rely to their detriment on false copyright
notices and those who have their speech effectively chilled by assertions of
such fraudulent rights.8 ' He also draws a compelling case for why the
elements of traditional fraud suits should be relaxed in the case of
copyright abuse. As he writes:
Because false copyrights have a constitutional dimension-interfering
with creativity and free expression-they deserve a more vigorous
enforcement approach than do other kinds of fraud. Copyfraud has broad
effects beyond the injury to individual victims who can demonstrate
detrimental reliance. Falsely marking a public domain work undermines
expression even if the false marking was not made with any intent to
trick somebody into making payment. Furthermore, many victims will
have suffered, individually, only a small monetary loss-for example,
paying out a few dollars in licensing fees-and might not readily
recognize the expressive injuries that they have suffered.
Additionally, any legislative action needs to account for the complicated
web of social pressures at play. In a world where a museum can inform an
editor at a scholarly press that it will simply refuse to do business with
anyone at that editor's home institution unless she pays $100 in spurious
"copyrights," straightforward legal action is not always possible. Even if
the copyright being asserted is transparently false, it is simply not worth the
80. For an overview of CAA's role as advocate, see Issues at a Glance I Advocacy I College
Art Association, http://www.collegeart.org/advocacy/issues/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
81. See Mazzone, supra note 77, at 1073-75.
82. Id. at 1074.
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editor's time, money, and social risk to do anything other than pay. For this
reason, one should take Mazzone's call for broad standing in copyright
misuse cases very seriously. Additionally, the academic and legal
communities need to lobby for civil fines-including substantial fines for
retaliation against those who contest copyright fraud-and attorney's fees
provisions sufficient to embolden not only scholars but also the
institutionally conservative universities who stand behind them to actually
consider suit.
Until the burdens and promises of the law are set in such a way that it
makes financial sense to challenge copyright abuse, museums and
companies like Bridgeman will continue to operate in a sort of legal
vacuum, capable of wielding a corrosive social pressure that prevents the
development of a robust common law.83 In a similar vein, art historians and
lawyers need to work together to see the holding in Bridgeman explicitly
adopted in other circuits and, ideally, affirmed on appeal. Until this occurs,
image licensors will persist in using the precedential ambiguity surrounding
Judge Kaplan's decision to intimidate image users into submission.
2.

Life After Bridgeman: A Question of Contract.

Any strategic action to strengthen Bridgeman should be designed to
address a disturbing way in which museums and other image licensors have
responded, and are likely to continue to respond, to the questioning of their
asserted copyright interests. In short, any attempts to develop Bridgeman
must confront the extent to which contract law is being called upon to
substitute for copyright. We have seen clear examples of this in
Bridgeman's Terms and Conditions, the Art Institute's reproduction
license, and the Met's dubious credit line. Incapable or uncertain of legally
vindicating their "copyright" in accurate reproductions of pubic domain
images, these image licensors effectively create their own system of
intellectual property rights through carefully drafted contracts.

83. For this reason, I disagree with Mazzone's proposal that a successful copyright misuse
action require a showing of intent. See, Mazzone, supra note 77, at 1074. I would favor a
negligence standard, thereby obligating those who stand to profit from the assertion of a
potentially questionable copyright to consider whether such claims are in fact reasonable. Such
questionable cases would include certain copyrights asserted in works created but not published
before January 1, 1978, the date the United States shifted from a publication to a creation
standard. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006). In such instances, the copyright term depends upon whether
the work was subsequently published before January 1, 2003. Id. If it was not, the copyright term
runs for the artist's life plus seventy years or through December 31, 2002, whichever is longer. id.
If it was published during the interim, however, copyright persists through 2047. Id. To the extent
that this determination hinges upon the question of "publication," it can often be difficult to
make, especially for non-lawyers.

2008]

THE ANTITHESIS OF ORIGINALITY

Bridgeman provides the most blatant example of this with its
contractual provisions obligating its customers not to reproduce, publish,
distribute, or make derivative works based on its images. 84 As Bridgeman's
Terms and Conditions emphatically state, "THE COPYING OR
REPRODUCTION BY WHATEVER MEANS OF [Bridgeman's copy
photographs] IS STRICTLY FORBIDDEN ....
As discussed earlier,
Bridgeman defines "reproduction" to "inclu[de] any form of publication or
copying of the whole or part of any [of the underlying paintings it
reproduces] whether altered or not, and derived from" any of Bridgeman's
images.8 6 To the extent that anyone who uses one of Bridgeman's images is
presumed to have assented to these Terms and Conditions,87 Bridgeman has
clearly employed the law of contract to guarantee itself precisely that
privileged monopoly that the Copyright Act denies it. 88 In this sense, the
company's subsequent assertion that any violation of its Terms and
Conditions "will be an infringement of copyright" 89 does no more than
offer an explicit statement of the logic that runs throughout the document:
whatever rights Bridgeman cannot procure via copyright law, it intends to
take by contract.
This is a legally unfounded, deeply harmful logic, to say the least. It is
also, however, one that certain museums already appear to employ. In
addition to licensing agreements and credit lines, this logic often dictates
the level of visitor access that many museums permit to their collections.
As one museum guide to copyright succinctly put it:
There is no reason why such images of even public domain objects
cannot be licensed-the real problem is not the copyright laws but the
fact that there are many competing originals ....

What can the museum

do? The museum must secure the exclusivity [of its own reproductions
of the works in its collection]; it must require that no person who has
access to its collections either on site, or taken away for research
purposes, or loaned elsewhere, can be permitted to take photographs,
recordings, copies or other reproductions
except on specific terms agreed
9
[to] in advance with the museum. 0
Just like Bridgeman, this guide advocates using the law of contract to lock
down those rights previously provided by copyright. The rights and
reproductions department at the savvy museum must structure any
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at "Definitions."
Id. at cl. 11.
Id. at "Definitions."
See Terms and Conditions, supra note 3.
See supra Part Ill(A).
Terms and Conditions, supra note 3, at cl. 21.

90. PETER WIENDAND, ANNA BOOY & ROBIN FRY, A GUIDE TO COPYRIGHT FOR
MUSEUMS AND GALLERIES 53 (Routledge 2000).
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reproduction of the collection according to "specific terms" that will allow
the institution to maintain a profitable intellectual property interest in its
works, regardless of whether those works are protected by copyright or
belong to the public domain.
It is striking to note how many museums appear to have adopted this
tack: "Still photography for personal use is permitted in collection galleries
only. No flash or tripods allowed;" 91 "Photography is not permitted in the
galleries. Flash photography is permitted only with a handheld camera in
the Atrium;, 92 "Still photography is permitted for private, noncommercial
use only in the Museum's galleries devoted to the permanent collection.
Photographs cannot be published, sold, reproduced, transferred, distributed,
or otherwise commercially exploited in any manner whatsoever .... The
use of a flash is prohibited. 9 3 Again and again, these museums assert that
no visitor may photographically copy any of the works in their collections,
drawing no distinction between works under copyright and those in the
public domain. "[T]he real problem," after all, "is not the copyright laws
but the fact that there are many competing originals . . . The separate
prohibition against flashes in each instance further suggests that the harm to
be avoided with the general photography ban lies in the realm of
intellectual property, rather than, for example, archival concerns. In fact,
what one is looking at here is not a general photography ban at all but
rather a proscription against photographs taken for commercial use. It is a
prohibition, in other words, against visitors interfering with the museum's
monopoly in reproductions of its images-a monopoly to which, in the
context of public domain images, the museum has no lawful claim.
Critically, what one is looking at here might also be a contract. In so
carefully delineating the photographic practices not permitted in the
galleries, 95 these museums might be trying to establish a set of contractual
provisions to which visitors could be argued to assent by the very act of
purchasing a ticket and walking through the door. In this way, the museums
might be positioning themselves to threaten anyone who dares to publish a
picture he or she takes there with a breach of contract suit.
91. The Museum of Modem Art, Visiting the Museum, Visitor Policies -Cameras,
http://www.moma.org/visit_moma/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2008).
92. San Francisco Museum of Modem Art, Visitor Information, General Visitor
Information, Cameras, http://www.sfmoma.org/visit/visitinfo hours.asp (last visited Jan. 17,
2008).
93. The Metropolitan Museum of Art, Visitor Information, Gallery Photography Policy,
http://www.metmuseum.org/visitor/index.asp?HomePageLink=visitorjl
(last visited Jan. 14,
2008).
94. WIENAND, supra note 90.
95. The Met, MoMA, and SFMoMA all post these notices both on their websites and
throughout the galleries. See supra notes 91-93.
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It is important here to note that the efficacy of such a claim would not
necessarily hinge upon its eventual legal success on the merits. As Justice
Marshall wrote so eloquently in the context of the First Amendment, "the
value of a sword of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops., 96 One
could argue that by prohibiting commercial photography in such a visible
and repeated fashion, museums effectively position a contractual sword of
Damocles over all their patrons' heads. In so doing, they leverage their
control over the physical art object into a form of copyright in perpetuity.
After all, if museums are free to use the grant of access to their art as
contractual consideration, they are arguably free to set the terms under
which that art is accessed, including the terms under which it is reproduced,
published, and used in derivative works. Under these circumstances, it
matters little that the Copyright Act itself specifies that "[o]wnership of a
copyright, or of any of the exclusive rights under a copyright, is distinct
97
from ownership of any material object in which the work is embodied,,
Under these circumstances, "the real problem" truly "is not the copyright
laws" but rather the way in which the museums, like Bridgeman,
98
effectively stage a contractual end run around them.
Art historians and lawyers need to structure any development of
Bridgeman with this contractual end run in mind. Specifically, efforts to
bolster Judge Kaplan's opinions should simultaneously strive to shut down
the secondary contractual avenues that image licensors can be expected to
fall back on as they lose copyright footing. At least two viable positions
exist in response to such contractual arguments. Both of these positions
could be asserted either as independent actions for declaratory judgment or
as defenses to allegations of contractual breach.
3.

Unconscionable ContractsofAdhesion.

A compelling argument exists that both the sort of contract epitomized
by Bridgeman's Terms and Conditions and museums' aggressive "no
commercial photography in the gallery" policies constitute unenforceable
contracts of adhesion. The Supreme Court has characterized adhesion
contracts as "form contracts offered on a take-or-leave basis by a party with
stronger bargaining power to a party with weaker power." 99 Admittedly,
96. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall J., dissenting).
97. 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).
98. See WIENAND, supra note 90.
99. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 600 (1991). See also, JLM Indus.,
Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d. Cir. 2004) ("a contract of adhesion is a contract
formed as a product of a gross inequality of bargaining power between parties. A court will find
adhesion only when the party seeking to rescind the contract establishes that the other party used
high pressure tactics, or deceptive language, or that the contract is unconscionable. Typical
contracts of adhesion are standard-form contracts offered by large, economically powerful
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courts are reticent to brand agreements between parties as unenforceable
contracts of adhesion. As the Second Circuit has stated so evocatively,
"[t]he concept of adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty
into the Eden of contract enforcement. At the very least, it represents a
serious challenge to orthodox contract law that a contract is to be
interpreted in accordance with the objective manifestation of the parties'
intent. '' l° As such, "it is very difficult to establish that an agreement is an
unenforceable adhesion contract."'' 1
Not only must the party challenging a contract's enforceability
demonstrate adhesion, he or she must also show that the contested contract
is unconscionable. Adhesion contracts are, on their own, enforceable; only
unconscionable adhesion contracts provoke judicial invalidation. 10 2 At
base, a finding of unconscionability hinges on the court's determination
that the contract is untenably unfair. In deciding whether a contract rises (or
sinks) to this singular level, a court will look to factors such as the parties'
relative bargaining power; whether the terms of the contract were actually
open to negotiation and change; whether, if the contract was presented on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis, the accepting party had actual, viable alternatives;
the level of economic pressure, fraud, or surprise involved in the bargaining
process; and, critically, whether the contract, if enforced, would function
contrary to public policy. 10 3 When one considers these factors, museumcorporations to unrepresented, uneducated, and needy individuals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis,
with no opportunity to change the contract's terms.").
100. Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d. Cir. 1997).
101. DeJohn v. The TV Corp. Intern., 245 F.Supp.2d 913, 919 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
102. See Smith, Bucklin & Assocs., Inc. v. Sonntag, 83 F.3d 476, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(contract of adhesion is enforceable unless it is unconscionable); see also Kristian v. Comcast
Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 42 (1st Cir. 2006) ("under Massachusetts law, contracts of adhesion.., are
generally enforceable absent a separate finding that such contracts are unconscionable, offend
public policy, or are shown to be unfair in the particular circumstances.) (internal quotation
omitted); Am. Gen. Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Wood, 429 F.3d 83, 88 (4th Cir. 2005) ("[rlather
than adopting a per se rule, West Virginia courts aim at distinguishing good adhesion contracts
which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which should not.") (internal quotation
omitted); Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 503 (adhesion contracts enforceable under
Tennessee law unless shown to be unconscionable).
103. See, e.g., JLM Indus., Inc., 387 F.3d at 169 ("a contract of adhesion is a contract formed
as a product of a gross inequality of bargaining power between parties. A court will find adhesion
only when the party seeking to rescind the contract establishes that the other party used high
pressure tactics, or deceptive language, or that the contract is unconscionable. Typical contracts
of adhesion are standard-form contracts offered by large, economically powerful corporations to
unrepresented, uneducated, and needy individuals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, with no
opportunity to change the contract's terms."); Desiderio v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 191
F.3d 198, 207 (2d. Cir. 1999) ("[a] contract or clause is unconscionable when there is an "absence
of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party."); Soc'y of Lloyd's v. Reinhart, 402 F.3d 982, 997
(10th Cir. 2005) ("[s]ubstantive unconscionability is concerned with contract terms that are
illegal, contrary to public policy, or grossly unfair.") (internal citations omitted); DeJohn., 245
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goers and those who purchase reproductions of public domain images
possess a strong argument that they are captive parties to various image
licensors' unconscionable contracts of adhesion. As a primary matter, the
actual bargaining involved in these contracts is de minimus. In the case of
Bridgeman, the company states that it automatically incorporates its online
Terms and Conditions into its licensing agreements. 10 4 Moreover,
Bridgeman presumes any first-time licensee to have assented to these
conditions as soon as he or she uses one of its images.' 0 5 Repeat customers
are presumed to have assented by the simple fact of their return. 10 6 Under
these circumstances, there is little room for meaningful negotiation. Indeed,
it is likely that many of Bridgeman's clients have no idea that they have
assented to the online provisions, much less that they've explicitly "agreed"
that any violation thereof "will be an infringement of copyright" in direct
defiance of federal caselaw.' °7 The museum visitor enjoys even less room
to negotiate. Flatly informed by numerous signs that "[s]till photography is
permitted for private, noncommercial use only," the art lover essentially
has three options: assent and go in, assent but protest by going home, or
refuse and, in the wonderful formulation of Susan Bielstein, "go shutterbugging through the galleries flashing away, a posse of guards on [his] tail.
• . 10 These courses of action might share something with those of
obedient school children, insolent teenagers, and Evel Knievel,
respectively. They bear little resemblance, however, to what the law
recognizes as binding offer and acceptance.
Second, the situation currently created by various image licensors is
marked by a paucity of viable alternatives. In the case of the museums, the
reasons for this are obvious. Most art objects are, by definition, unique.
Indeed to put it bluntly, art takes its value-both cultural and financialfrom the very fact of this uniqueness.10 9 One tends to understand this
intuitively: it is the rare individual who thrills to a poster of Manet's
Goldfish, even rarer is he will pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for it.
When the Met blocks full photographic access to Eakins' Max Schmitt in a

F.Supp.2d at 919 ("[a] contract is significantly unfair only if its terms are oppressive,
unconscionable, contrary to public policy or not within the reasonable expectations of the weaker

party.").
104. See Terms and Conditions, supra note 3.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at cl. 21.
108. BIELSTEIN, supra note 5, at 50.
109. Photographs, prints, and cast sculpture obviously all challenge this notion of the art
object's unique status. Critically, however, in order to be accepted as high art, all of these media
have adopted production conventions that limit the possibility of fungibility. Examples of such
conventions include printing in limited series and destroying molds after a run.
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Single Scull (1871), then, no alternative remains; there is no replacement
painting to photograph.
Critics might argue with this, asserting that meaningful alternatives
abound. If all one wants, after all, is to make a publishable copy
photograph of the Eakins, why not simply license a copy from the
Museum?110 Or, if one is an academic affiliated with a college or
university, why not obtain it for free off of ARTstor through the Met's new
Scholar's License Program?"'1 Such arguments miss the point. Museums
are able to prolong valuable but unlawful intellectual property interests in
public domain art only because they succeed in guarding the physical art
object so closely. As institutions, they only bolster this guard when they
appease the academic community by making "gifts" of images that
everyone already shares. The answer to the chorus of "why nots,"
therefore, is extremely simple: because we all have the right not to.
As for the lack of viable alternatives in Bridgeman's situation, the
company essentially conceded this point at trial. In order to succeed on its
claim, Bridgeman was required to show both that it possessed a valid
copyright in its images and that Corel literally copied those images. In
order to prove the second-or actual copying-prong, Bridgeman argued
that "the owners of the underlying works of art ... strictly limit access to
those works,"'"1 2 and that it "had the only images of the works in question
' 13
and that the works themselves could not have been photographed anew." "
Bridgeman grounded its copyright infringement claim, in other words, on

110.

Or, since the Met currently outsources its rights and reproductions, from Art Resource?

See BIELSTEIN, supra note 5.

111. See ARTstor, New
Service:
Images
for Academic
Publishing (lAP),
http://www.artstor.org/news/n-html/an-070321-iap.shtml (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). "In a new
initiative designed to assist scholars with teaching, study, and the publication of academic works,
The Metropolitan Museum of Art will distribute, free of charge, high-resolution digital images
from an expanding array of works in its renowned collection for use in academic publications.
This new service, which is effective immediately, is available through ARTstor, a non-profit
organization that makes art images available for educational use." The Metropolitan Museum of
Art - Press Room - Curren Press Releases, Metropolitan Museum and ARTstor Announce
Pioneering Initiative to Provide Digital Images to Scholars at No Charge, March 12, 2007,
http://www.metmuseum.org/press-room/full-release.asp?prid=%7BA 113EOAD-AA4E-47IB8F04-736A21F1A70A%7D (last visited Jan. 17, 2008). It is worth noting here, that despite the
Met's generosity, only scholars-and specifically those affiliated with an institution capable of
paying ARTstor's subscription fees-are eligible to receive these images. Moreover, the press
release makes no mention of the public domain, styling the partnership between the Met and
ARTstor as an advancement in digital imaging instead. For these reasons, I view this program as
a sort of safety valve, decided to placate academics and prevent them from jockeying for their full

rights.
112.
113.

Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 25 F.Supp.2d 421, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Id. at 428 n.50.
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the lack of viable alternatives." 4 Moreover, any similarly situated image
licensor would need to ensure a similar lack of alternatives in order to
successfully survive. The existence of meaningful options would, quite
simply, mean that evaporation of a licensable intellectual property interest.
As the museum copyright guide noted, "the real problem is ...the fact that
there are many competing originals."'" 15
Finally, in staging an adhesive contractual end run around the
Copyright Act, image licensors like Bridgeman and various museums
violate constitutionally grounded public policy. As the Fourth Circuit held
in Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds:
The grant to the author of the special privilege of a copyright carries out
a public policy adopted by the Constitution and laws of the United
States, 'to promote the Progress of Science and useful arts, by securing
for limited Times to [Authors] ...the exclusive Right . . .' to their

'original' work. But the public policy which includes original works
within the granted monopoly excludes from it all that is not embraced in
the original expression.

With its Terms and Conditions, Bridgeman sweeps its uncopyrightable
reproductions of public domain works into the monopoly of copyright." 7
Similarly, by proscribing commercial photography in the galleries,
museums extend this monopoly to works that have already passed out of it.
Both of these actions violate the public policy motivating the Copyright
Act itself. "The 'ultimate aim"' of copyright law, after all, is "to stimulate
artistic creativity for the general public good." ' 1 8 The use of adhesion
contracts to impede the free flow of ideas, scholarship and the sort of
cultural bricolage by which our society creates and defines itself frustrates
this "ultimate aim" with shocking success. Such contracts should be
invalidated as unconscionable." '9
114. A lack of viable alternatives, interestingly, that stemmed from a museum prohibition on
photography.
115. WIENDAND, supra note 90, at 53.
116. Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 977 (4th Cir. 1990) (quoting U.S
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006)).
117. Terms and Conditions, supra note 3.
118. Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista Home Entm't, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 204 (3d. Cir.
2004) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984)).
119. One could argue that intellectual property that has passed into the public domain has
fallen outside of the purview of the Copyright Act and its strictures and is therefore open to any
sort of private contracting. Such an argument, however, ignores both the constitutionally
mandated policy driving the Copyright Act and the legal monopoly that the copyright owner has
already enjoyed. Having previously benefited from this monopoly, the prior copyright owner
simply is not free to say that his or her intellectual property is now, in effect, neutral, not subject
to the requirement that it be turned over to the public domain "to Promote the progress of Science
and the useful art ......Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in Eldred v. Ashcroft may,
destructively, have "demu[rred]" to the petitioners' seemingly commonsense argument that "the
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Preemption Under 17 U.S.C. § 301.

A strong argument also exists that contracts such as Bridgeman's
Terms and Conditions and museums' photography policies are preempted
by the Copyright Act itself. 17 U.S.C. section 301(a) states, "all legal or
equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the
general scope of copyright" are preempted by federal law. 120 Under the
statute, "no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any
' 21

such work under the common law or statutes of any State."'
In order to be preempted in this fashion, "(1) the work at issue must
come within the subject matter of copyright; and (2) the state law [i.e.,
contractual] rights must be equivalent to the exclusive rights of
copyright.', 22 Satisfying the first requirement is straightforward: sections
102 and 103 of Title 17 elaborate the classes of works protected under the
Copyright Act. These include literary, musical, pictorial, and sculptural
creations, as well as compilations and derivations. 23 In practice, it is the
second hurdle, that of "equivalence," that proves difficult to meet. One
seeking a ruling of preemption bears the burden of proving that the contract
at issue contains no "extra element, beyond mere copying, preparation of
derivative works, performance, distribution or display . .
,.2.If the
contract contains such an "extra element," "then the stated cause of action
is qualitatively different from, and therefore not subsumed within, a
copyright infringement
claim. In such cases, federal law will not preempt
125
the state action."'
The courts remain frustratingly vague as to what actually constitutes
such an "extra element." It appears that an agreement to purchase

Copyright Clause 'imbeds a quid pro quo."' 537 U.S. 186, 214 (2002). It strikes me, however,
that even this poorly reasoned demurral cannot change the fact that the Copyright Clause grants
its beneficiaries an advantage that they otherwise never would have possessed under the
American legal system in exchange for the public good. In light of the boon that has already
inhered, the owner of an expired copyright has no ground to argue that his or her intellectual
property now exists free and clear of the copyright scheme, that it is, effectively, not beholden to
the public good. See id. at 245 (Breyer J., dissenting) ("The Constitution itself describes the basic
Clause objective as one of 'promot[ing] the Progress of Science,' i.e., knowledge and learning.
The Clause exists not to 'provide a special private benefit,' but 'to stimulate artistic creativity for
the general public good.' It does so by 'motivat[ing] the creative activity of authors' through 'the
provision of a special reward.' The 'reward' is a means, not an end. And that is why the
copyright term is limited. It is limited so that its beneficiaries--the public--'will not be
permanently deprived of the fruits of an artist's labors."')(internal citations omitted).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a).
121. Id.
122. Grosso v.Miramax Film Corp., 383 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004).
123. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.
124. Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp, 36 F.3d 1147, 1164 (1st Cir. 1994).
125. Id.
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something or to pay someone qualifies, as does a duty of confidentiality.
That said, "[n]ot every 'extra element' of a state claim will establish a
qualitative variance between the rights protected by federal copyright law
and those protected by state law."'126 As a result, the stronger one's
evidence that a party relied on contract law strictly to prevent others from
copying, adapting, publicly performing or publicly displaying a particular
work, the better one's chances of preemption.
Bridgeman's assertion that any violation of its contractual Terms and
Conditions, for example, seems to provide a clear case of a "legal or
equitable righ[t]" that is both "equivalent to ...the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright" and lacking in any meaningful extra
element. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit and the Eastern District of
California have both suggested that courts will also look to the breadth of a
particular contract's effect in making their preemption determination. As
the Meridian court stated, "[a] copyright is a right against the world.
Contracts, by contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do
as they please, so contracts do not create exclusive rights."' 127 This suggests
that the more "strangers" the contract implicates-and the more exclusive
the right thereby created-the more probable it is that a court will preempt.
This rationale might prove particularly robust in the case of museums,
where the ban on commercial photography automatically implicates
everyone who passes through the galleries. It might also interlock
effectively with the public policy arguments involved in contracts of
adhesion. The stronger one's argument that image licensors impede "the
Progress of Science and the useful arts" by using contracts to effectively
staunch the flow of images into the public domain, the stronger one's
argument for preemption under section 301.
V. Conclusion
Image licensors like Bridgeman and certain museums currently take
advantage of underdeveloped case law, social pressure, and the
inadequacies of the Copyright Act itself to force the public to pay for a
right they already possess: the right to meaningfully engage with artwork
that has passed into the public domain. The harms that flow from this are
real and serious, not simply for art history graduate students like myself
looking down the barrel of thousands of dollars in permissions fees, but
also for our culture as a whole. As Lawrence Lessig so accurately argues,
"[c]reators here and everywhere are always and at all times building upon
126. Id.
127. Meridian Project Sys., Inc. v. Hardin Constr. Co., LLC, 426 F.Supp.2d 1101, 1108 (E.D.
CA. 2006) (internal citations omitted).
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the creativity that went before and that surrounds them now. That building
is always and everywhere at least partially done without permission and
without compensating the original creator."' 128 By demanding that scholars
pay $300 for a single reproduction of the Mona Lisa or that no tourist
publicly display a picture of an Old Masters painting that he or she took on
vacation, image licensors not only defy the law, they undermine the very
process of dialogue and bricolage by which our culture evolves. This
simply cannot be.
In addition to the steps that I have discussed here, the art and legal
communities need to take an active role in educating their constituencies as
to the state of the law on these issues. This is particularly true in the case of
art historians. Often individuals have no idea that anything is amiss when
an image licensor demands hundreds of dollars in "copyright" fees for a
reproduction of a painting made in the sixteenth century. Nor do many art
historians realize that their rights have been violated when that same
licensor demands that they mark said reproduction with the notice "©
2007" (copyright inhering in the licensor, of course). In an environment
where the pressures to simply put one's head down and work-to publish
on one's selected comer of the world and not cause trouble-are immense,
inciting any change often takes massive effort. Hopefully this article will
succeed in contributing to that effort in some small part.

128. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 29 (Penguin Press 2004). As Lessig

writes, "[flree cultures are cultures that leave a great deal open for others to build upon; unfree, or
permission, cultures leave much less." Id. at 30. See also LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF
IDEAS, THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 20 (Random House 2002).

